Counter-Mortar Operational Research in the 21 Army Group by Copp, Terry
Canadian Military History
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 5
1-20-2012
Counter-Mortar Operational Research in the 21
Army Group
Terry Copp
Wilfrid Laurier University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
Copp, Terry (1994) "Counter-Mortar Operational Research in the 21 Army Group," Canadian Military History: Vol. 3: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol3/iss2/5
Terry Copp 
The campaign in Northwest Europe has been the subject of thousands of books 
and articles, including a number based on 
careful documentary research. But even the 
best accounts pay insufficient attention to 
the German weapons systems that inflicted 
the majority of Allied casualties. The mortar 
and the Nebelwerfer were chiefly responsible 
for the Wehrmacht's temporary success in 
stabilizing the front in Normandy, and for the 
balance of the war they played a major role in 
demoralizing and reducing the strength of 
Allied infantry units. The Allies did not 
foresee the central role these weapons would 
play in Northwest Europe and all three armies 
left counter-mortar operations to the initiative 
of individual divisional commanders. 
This paper focuses on the work of 21 Army 
Group's No. 2 Operational Research Section 
(ORS) in developing a sys temat ic and 
ultimately successful system of neutralizing 
enemy mortar and Nebelwerfer fire. Other 
at tempts to deal with the problem were 
u n d e r t a k e n c o n c u r r e n t l y in the 
Mediterranean theatre and in First American 
Army but they are not examined here. 
The British Army became involved in operational research in 1940 when P. M .S. 
Blackett was appointed scientific advisor to 
Anti-Aircraft Command. Blackett's "Circus," 
as the army's first OR group was called, 
developed into two quite separate sections, 
one dealing with radar equipment, and the 
other with problems of operat ing tha t 
equipment effectively with the available 
personnel. Blackett instructed a group of 
very young and very b r igh t scientific 
generalists to figure out what to do with the 
first Gun Laying radar, the GL Mark I. It 
consisted of a small hut with an aerial attached 
to it. The entire hut could be rotated by a pair 
of bicycle pedals at the top of a column. The 
levelness of the immediate area, the soil type, 
the weather, and the proximity of trees and 
huts distorted the signal. Each set had to be 
"screened" with chicken wire, and individually 
calibrated. Even then there was little chance 
of hitting anything because minor human 
errors compounded the problems of a 
rudimentary fire control apparatus. This was 
an ideal problem for OR investigation involving 
the interface of men and complex equipment. 
During the course of the war technical 
developments in radar were paralleled by 
improvements in training and operational 
procedures developed by the OR section. In 
1944 Anti-Aircraft command played a major 
role in the destruction of the VI Flying Bomb.1 
After Blackett left the Army to establish 
an OR section with RAF Coastal Command, a 
South African physicist, Lieutenant-Colonel, 
later Brigadier, B.F.G. Schonland became 
the Superintendent of the Army Operational 
Research Group (AORG). Schonland had 
served in the First World War with the Royal 
Engineers. He was twice mentioned-in-
dispatches and ended the war as a Chief 
Instructor in Wireless Communications. In 
the interwar period he es tab l i shed an 
international scientific reputation for his 
studies of lightning, and he was an early 
exper imente r with ca thode ray t u b e s . 
Schonland's military and scientific credentials 
were important, but it was his personality 
that won him influence with military officers. 
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In the spring of 1944 Montgomery agreed to a 
proposal to appoint Schonland as Scientific 
Advisor, 21 Army Group, a position which 
gave Schonland immediate access to the 
intelligence, planning, and operations staffs 
of the Anglo-Canadian Army Group.2 
Schonland was determined to prevent 
operational research from being restricted to 
narrow technical functions. He, like Blackett, 
was convinced that scientists should be 
attached to operational commands, with direct 
access to the real operational data. This had 
a l r eady been accompl i shed with A.A. 
command and in 1941 an Army Operational 
Research Section worked closely with the 
Royal Navy to establish procedures for using 
the first centrimetric coastal radar sets 
designed to detect a German invasion fleet. 
This naturally led to studies of the use of 
radar in coastal artillery fire which had proven 
much less accurate than the gunners had 
supposed. Schonland urged the Royal Artillery 
to investigate the employment of radar as a 
way of improving the accuracy of field and 
medium artillery, bu t senior officers at 
Larkhill, the artillery school, were not 
impressed with the experimental evidence of 
radar echoes from ground burs ts or with 
suggestions that their methods of employing 
predicted fire were subject to serious error. 
Information that mortar bombs could be seen 
in the early part of their trajectories by the 
new (1943) GL Mark IIIB radars was also 
ignored prior to the invasion of Northwest 
Europe , 3 p r e sumab ly b e c a u s e exist ing 
counter-battery methods had proved adequate 
for dealing with mortars in North Africa. 
A crew from Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal training with the 3 -inch mortar, February 1943. 
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Schonland continued to press for the 
extension of OR into all areas of army activity 
and by mid-1943 operat ional research 
sections were established at the army schools 
for airborne forces, artillery, armour and 
infantry. The first scientist assigned to the 
school of infantry at Barnard Castle in 
Yorkshire was Captain Michael Swann, a 
twenty-three year old REME officer with an 
abbreviated war-time degree in Zoology. 
Swann had taken the army radar course and 
spent a winter in Iceland helping to optimize 
local air and coastal defence practices. On 
his return to the U.K. Schonland assigned 
him to First Airborne Division where he worked 
on aids for night operations and the radar 
beacon system for paratroops known as 
Rebecca-Eureka.4 
Swann shared many of Schonland 's 
personality characteristics, including strong 
intellectual curiosity and an easy manner in 
dealing with officers of higher rank and greater 
age. In Yorkshire the infantry instructors 
discovered that Swann would devise and 
implement systems for testing the efficacy of 
both weapons and doctrines. His work on the 
use of the Bren light machine gun, the PIAT 
(a spring-loaded infantry anti-tank projector) 
and the 2-inch and 3-inch infantry mortars 
was instrumental in establishing guidelines 
for their use.5 
Swann paid particular attention to mortars 
and supervised elaborate tests of the "new" 
stepped-up British 3-inch mortar, comparing 
it to the German 81 mm mortar.6 By the end 
of 1943 Swann knew a great deal about Allied 
and enemy mortars but he had not been 
asked to tackle the problem of mortar location. 
At this stage of the war hostile mortar location 
was still part of the basic duties of field and 
medium regimental counter-battery officers 
who employed sound ranging, flash spotting, 
crater analysis and other techniques to locate 
enemy artillery. 
In the spring of 1944 Schonland selected 
a team of OR scientists to serve in the field 
with Montgomery's 21 Army Group. They 
were all generalists who had developed insight 
and skills working with a specific branch of 
the army. Michael Swann, despite the fact 
that he was the youngest of the group, became 
second-in-command and the effective leader 
of No. 2 Operational Research Section. 
During the preparat ions for and the 
immediate aftermath of D-Day, the officers of 
No. 2 ORS were assigned to a variety of high 
priority tasks connected to radar or battlefield 
investigation. It was not until D+17, June 24, 
that the section was in a position to undertake 
new research. They began to visit the forward 
area "to gain ideas of what fighting looked like 
and to find out for ourselves where our 
particular way of doing things fitted in."7 
Swann, who got caught up in the defence of a 
newly-captured village during a German 
counterattack, recalled that "in those days 
the bridgehead was so small we could easily 
drive down to the battle area in half an hour, 
spend a day there and come back in the 
evening, to bathe in the meandering River 
Seulles, search for Calvados liqueur in Creully 
and discuss at length the great problems 
before us." 
One of the chief problems was "the location 
of enemy mortars , which were caus ing 
appalling casualt ies and proving almost 
impossible to deal with." This was a classic 
OR challenge, a problem "midway between 
the technical and the operational." The first 
thing to do was to establish the operational 
facts and the section devoted as much time as 
i t could to g a t h e r i n g the n e c e s s a r y 
information. The section's report began with 
a statement of "The Extent of the Problem"" 
The German army uses mortars and Nebelwerfers 
in large numbers. These weapons are small and 
difficult to detect from the air; their trajectories 
make it possible to conceal them completely from 
ground observation, particularly in close country. 
The small noise of discharge of the mortar and the 
ripple fire of the Nebelwerfer make sound ranging 
difficult, while the flash and smoke from the mortar 
is slight and hard to spot. In defence the casualties 
from mortars and nebelwerfers may be considerable, 
while the strain of holding a position and being 
mortared for days on end is intense. In attack the 
casualties in forming up areas and on the objective 
may be very heavy indeed, and are often decisive in 
throwingback an attack. In either attack or defences, 
mortars can make movement in forward areas 
difficult. 
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So much has long be realized. In the present 
campaign, however, casualties from mortars have 
been particularly heavy and have contributed as 
much as anything else to making advances slow 
and costly. The enemy's mortars are as much a 
weapon to be defeated as his tanks. This will 
continue as long as fighting goes on in undulating 
and cultivated country. Even on the plains of 
Picardy and Flanders, there is enough cover to 
conceal mortars, and although their importance 
may decline, they are still likely to prove a great 
source of trouble.8 
Swarm interviewed battalion medical 
officers from four different mortar divisions 
and found that all agreed in placing the 
proportion of mortar casualties at above 70% 
of total casualties. He found that divisional 
C o u n t e r - M o r t a r staffs t e n d e d to u n -
derestimate the number of mortars and 
Nebelwerfers opposite them, noting that a 
German infantry division possessed as many 
48 
as fifty-seven 81 mm mortars and between 12 
and 20 of the 120 mm type. Panzer divisions 
were equipped with about half these numbers. 
In Normandy, the German army had also 
provided a regiment composed of 54 six-
barrel Nebelwerfers on the scale of one per 
division. Swann estimated that to bring the 
problem under control divisions might need 
to obtain between 60 and 80 hostile mortar 
locations. 
He noted that "at present no official 
organization for counter-mortar work" existed 
in the British Army and each division went its 
own way. All the divisions surveyed had 
appointed a Counter-Mortar Officer and 
a l lo t ted s igna ls capac i ty to allow for 
communication to the plotting centre, but 
arrangements were ad hoc and no one was 
sure what worked best. Swann analyzed the 
A private from Le Régiment de Maisonneuve and a French civilian examine a captured German Nebelwerfer. 
Photo by Lt. George Cooper, NAC PA 129127 
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Hostile Mortar Lists compiled by four 
divisions. Each used sound bear ings 
extensively, but there was no system for 
ensuring the rapid reporting of all instances 
of enemy mortaring and only one division had 
established separate observation posts with 
the responsibility for mortar location. Air 
photographs were widely used in conjunction 
with s o u n d bea r ings and had proved 
particularly effective in locating Nebelwerfers 
which were sometimes concentra ted in 
batteries. Observation aircraft were generally 
unable to spot mortars though the flash and 
smoke of the Nebelwerfer rockets were 
occasionally seen. Flash spotting, either 
from the ground or from sixty-foot towers, 
which had worked so well in the desert, was 
of little use in Normandy where the Germans 
almost always fired from reverse slope 
positions. The microphones of the Counter-
Battery sound-ranging bases, deployed 4,000 
to 5,000 yards behind the Forward Defence 
Line, occasionally picked up mortar locations 
but only one division had seriously exploited 
this resource. 
Four-pen recorders, a miniature (1,500 
yards) sound-ranging base of four posts 
connected to a recording machine in which 
four pens recorded the vibrations from the 
four microphones and deduced the location 
of the hostile mortar,9 were in use but there 
were only three sets available in all of 21 
Army Group. When in working condition the 
four-pen recorder produced good results, but 
the gunners and infantrymen assigned to 
maintain and operate them had not been 
properly trained nor had an OR team been 
employed to study the man-machine interface. 
Crater examination, a favoured method of 
determining the bearing of hostile batteries 
at the School of Artillery, was of little use in 
battle conditions where probing about in a 
recent mortar crater could not be realistically 
recommended. 
This left radar. The OR section was told 
that a GL MK III had been tried out in the 
early days of the invasion after it was reported 
that mortar trajectories showed up on A.A. 
battery radar sets. Indeed mortar bombs had 
been detected at ranges of 7,000 yards and 
Nebelwerfer clusters at 11,000 yards. Field 
trials had met with mixed success and had 
not been followed up. Schonland and Swann 
believed that the OR section could help the 
army to greatly increase the effectiveness of 
radar. If further GL MK III and 4-pen recorders 
were made available, and the work co-
ordinated with properly trained counter-
A German Nebelwerfer battery prepares Jor action. Each German division in Normandy had at its disposal one 
Nebelwerfer regiment composed of 54 six-barrelled launcher. The 15 cm Nebelwerfer could ripple off six shells 
in 10 seconds or three salvoes of six shells injive minutes to a maximum distance of 6900 metres. The peculiar 
noise made by the Nebelwerfer led Allied troops to name it "Moaning Minnie. " 
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mortar staffs, the goal of 60 to 80 locations a 
day could be reached on static fronts.10 Swann 
cautioned that even with such changes, 
existing radar and four-pen recorders were 
useful only on static fronts and could not 
a s s i s t where improved coun t e r -mor t a r 
methods were most needed, in advance and 
consolidation. 
No. 2 ORS's Report on the Location of 
Enemy Mortars was delayed by orders that 
the section give priority to a study of the 
effectiveness of heavy bombers in the land 
battle, so it did not reach the Counter-Mortar 
Committee of Second British Army until early 
August.11 Brigadier Schonland was present 
to argue the case Swann had made and to add 
his own views about the role of radar on the 
battlefield. He noted that the American SCR 
584 was vastly preferable to the British or 
Canadian GL Ills but none were available. 
The new British 10 cm equipment, the F.A.3 
which was mounted on a half-track, was well-
suited for employment in the field but the 
first three would not be delivered until mid-
October. In the meantime it was important to 
organize counter-mortar units with a staff at 
divisional H.Q. and an officer with a small 
staff at each brigade. The Canadians had 
already added personnel to man specific 
counter-mortar listening posts and this 
system was adopted in British Second Army. 
The Corps Survey Regiment was to receive 
extra personnel and equipment to operate 
additional Four-Pen Recorder teams across 
the front. The Committee also decided to 
recommend the creation of a "Radar Battery" 
for each army "organized into 3 sections of 3 
GL Ills plus 1 spare." It was agreed that "in 
view of the extreme urgency of the problem 
there must be no lengthy haggling over 
details."12 
By late September both 1 Canadian Radar 
Battery and 100 British Radar Battery were 
organized and a ten day training course "in 
the theory and drill of locating mortars" was 
u n d e r w a y . At the d iv i s iona l level, 
organizational changes were implemented in 
time to assist the British in the Arnhem 
Salient and the Canadians in the battle of the 
Scheldt, but the two Radar Batteries were not 
ready for an operational role until January 
1945. 
A German 80 mm mortar crew in action. This weapon 
could throw a 3.5 kg high explosive or smoke shell to 
a minimum distance of 60 metres or a maximum of 
2400 metres at a rate of 15-25 shells per minute. The 
difficulty of spotting a well-emplaced mortar crew is 
evident from these photos. 
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The Canadian Radar Battery was deployed 
in the Nijmegen area in support of British and 
Canadian units of First Canadian Army. A 
scheme, Operation "Trojan," was devised to 
draw enemy fire and the radar sections 
pinpointed 19 locations in a three hour period. 
Three weeks later they played an important 
role in Operation "Elephant," an attack on a 
small but well-defended German position at 
Kapelsche Veer. Two GL Ills were deployed to 
cover the area across the River Maas and 
almost complete success was obtained in 
locating and relocating enemy mortars.13 
The enemy quickly reacted to these and 
other examples of improved mortar location 
techniques by waiting for long intervals 
between rounds, or firing a few rounds before 
moving some distance away. Both of these 
counter-measures "worked" in the sense that 
locations were more difficult to obtain, but 
escaping detection is not the main task 
assigned to mortar crews.14 
The real test of the new counter-mortar 
methods came in Operation "Veritable," the 
Anglo-Canadian attack down the west bank 
of the Rhine. Both the Canadian and British 
Radar Batteries were deployed to provide 
c o u n t e r - m o r t a r in format ion and nea r 
complete success was obtained. The attacking 
infantry reached their initial objectives, 
consolidated and moved forward to the next 
phase without any interference from enemy 
mortars.15 As the troops advanced south they 
moved out of range and the radar sets had to 
be moved forward quickly. One section 
working with 2nd Canadian Division came 
under heavy shellfire and two men were killed, 
though the set was not damaged and 
continued to report hostile mortar locations. 
The Germans used enormous quantities 
of artillery, Nebelwerfer and mortar fire in 
resisting the Allied advance and there was 
c o n s t a n t p r e s s u r e on all the r a d a r 
detachments until the battle ended in early 
March. Ten-ton radar sets proved to be of 
limited mobility in the flooded Rhineland 
landscape but they were relocated in forward 
areas and made a significant contribution to 
reducing casualties and speeding the advance. 
The relative success of post-Normandy 
counter-mortar techniques inevitably raises 
the question of why such a system was not in 
place earlier. All of the equipment actually 
used in 1945 was available in 1943 but the 
Army Operational Research Group was unable 
to persuade the Royal Artillery that the 
available radar equipment should be employed 
in land battle. The Mk III Gun Laying sets 
were in short supply and most of the available 
ones went to Anti-Aircraft Command and the 
Anti-Aircraft batteries for the defence of the 
Allied bridgehead in Normandy. 
There were other reasons for the slow 
recognition of the part radar might play in 
artillery support of land operations. When 
scientists of the Army Operational Research 
Group began to investigate the accuracy of 
predicted artillery fire they found that the 
gunners, who saw themselves as the scientists 
of the battlefield, had developed their 
techniques using a set of assumptions which 
rarely turned out to be as accurate as battle 
conditions demanded. The OR group fought 
a struggle, parallel to the one described here, 
to persuade the gunners to examine the results 
of predicted fire and to make use of radar in 
a number of ways including checking the 
RAF's "Meteor" messages which provided the 
essential information on air pressure, wind 
strength, and direction. Members of No.2 
ORS played a major role in converting the 
artillery to an operational research approach 
to gunnery but they could not accomplish 
this until the gunners themselves recognized 
the problem. Before the end of the battle of 
Normandy artillery officers were convinced 
that operational research was of great value 
and that Schonland's advice should be 
followed. This was a bit late for the soldiers 
who fought in Normandy, but two months is 
a relatively short period for most humans or 
most organizations to learn new ways of 
dealing with their problems. 
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